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CULTURAL LINGUISTICS AND TREATY LANGUAGE: A
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LANGUAGE TO CAPTURE THE TRIBE'S
UNDERSTANDING
BY
SAMMY MATSAW,* DYLAN HEDDEN-NICELY,* & BARBARA COSENS***
Language is a reflection of a thought world. A worldview that
has been shaped by place to describe one's identity in space and time
does not equate to species relatedness as a default to know one
another. In the legal system of the United States, there is
acknowledgement of treaties in colonized lands that there are rights
granted from the tribes and not to them, and those rights are land-
based. Yet, the Indigenous voice is dead before arrival, before it
enters the room of science, justice, academe, or otherwise. The
exclusion of Indigenous peoples at the table of knowledge and from
the power to make decisions within their homelands has proven a
detriment to the land, waterways, flora and fauna, and human
beings. Nowhere would tribal peoples have agreed to our own
destruction, it is and has been a forced hand. This Article explores
the changing interpretation of the U.S. Supreme Court canon to
construe treaties with Native American .tribes as the tribe would
have understood them, and why mere translation of Native
language to English fails to capture a Native understanding.
Through the juxtaposition of western legal analysis and the
powerful voice of a Native scientist, this Article illustrates how
difficult and yet how necessary it will be to bridge that divide if this
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powerful western nation is to fulfill its sacred promises to Native
people. As a contribution to the Issue on the fiftieth anniversary of
United States v. Oregon, this Article looks to the future of federal
jurisprudence on the interpretation of treaties with American
Indians and envisions one in which reconciliation through an
understanding of different worldviews is possible.
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The authors acknowledge that the region surrounding the University
of Idaho in Moscow, Idaho is the traditional homeland of the Nez Perce
and Coeur d'Alene peoples and that the University sits upon land that
was reserved by the Nez Perce Tribe in its Treaty with the United
States in 1855. Honor the treaties.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Indigenous World View
We are connected to all things. Being connected to all things runs
amiss in a Euro-context. The idea goes against the discrete perspective
of foundational thinking in the Western European (Western) worldview.
From Descartes to Bacon to Hume to academic philosophers teaching
droves of students everyday across colonized lands, the world is lived in
opposites, discrete, and deduced. As a consequence, the Indigenous voice
is dead before arrival, before it enters the room of science, justice,
academe or otherwise. It is easier to say we are disconnected from all
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things. That is a truthful fact and a sad statement. "All my relations" is
taken as a chaotic statement. The teachings are deeper than the chaos
that is implied, and would take a lifetime to live and to understand. One
cannot generate tribal intent without living this way of life no matter
how many pixels of categories make up the mosaic.
Language is a reflection of a thought world. A worldview that has
been shaped by place to describe one's identity in space and time does
not equate to species relatedness as a default to know one another. The
danger of this assumption defies how different and special cultures are
to one another and the distinctness of one's own culture within and
across species. Also, how special a particular place in the world is that
has shaped culture and language for many species in those lands. When
one travels to another place there is intrigue into the new lands, culture,
and foods. To enter into another's thought world is exciting. Traveling
can give us pause to our homelands, to how special our place is, our
language and culture.
Colonialism has been a strange traveling "adventure" and
permanent occupation. Some of the strangeness comes from the
assumptions made by Euro-colonists regarding Indigenous lands. One
assumption, in particular, is that Indigenous peoples are a former
primitive state of European man and therefore have no new knowledge
to contribute. A process of dehumanization follows this assumption
justifying massive undertakings such as Manifest Destiny bringing
civilization to savages. The idea of travel has lost its intrigue,
excitement, and adventure, thus the forced near extinction of a whole
thought world, and many thought worlds over the past few centuries.
There is a large incentive to gain billions of acres of land; perpetual
water rights may grow bountiful amounts of food and various forms of
energy can be captured in fossil fuels, hydro, wind, and solar. There are
far too many maladaptive traits accepted as the norm of colonized
societies to name here and far beyond the scope of this Article. However,
there is acknowledgement of treaties in colonized lands that there are
rights granted from the tribes and not to them, and those rights are
land-based. Nowhere would tribal peoples have agreed to our own
destruction, it is and has been a forced hand.
There is a loss of cultural and ecological diversity that is laden with
hubris assumptions and contradictions justifying the protection and
continuation of the status quo. There are parallels between the loss of
ecological processes and those processes of coupled human cultures of
Indigenous communities and their respective identities to land.
Matrilineal societies give rise to an ethic of the environment that
disrupts a patriarchal economic system beholden to racism, misogyny,
and .many other fears-xenophobia, in particular. In order to continue to
plunder the land embodied as a woman, it would logically follow that
the peoples whose cultures pay homage to her were to be wiped from the
land. The societal move of the Christian state was Manifest Destiny,
while on the other hand, justifying the secular West's progress,
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scientists-whether Lamarckian or later Darwinian believers-still had
underlying assumptions (a mostly obsolete theory of Social Darwinism).
The exclusion of Indigenous peoples at the table of knowledge, and the
power to make decisions within their homelands, has proven a
detriment to the land, waterways, flora and fauna, and human-beings.
Therefore, Indigenous peoples are not part of the over-arching
responsibility of the Anthropocene and climate change. We cannot be
inclusive to human-caused issues we were never party to. Our voice,
knowledge, and call to honor the treaties as supreme law of the land has
gone unheard, unacknowledged, and ultimately forgotten. For example,
a noble commentary in Nature Climate Change calls for Honouring
Indigenous Treaty Rights for Climate Justice to acknowledge the laws
protecting Indigenous lands from over-exploitation.
1 The article calls to
protect the environment through the laws (particularly at the
constitutional level) of the countries where treaties and governments
have a responsibility to protect the land in the interest of both parties.
2
Another article, Co-Management and the Co-Production of Knowledge:
Learning to Adapt in Canada's Artic, studied co-management hrough
the co-production of knowledge and found that the struggle lies amid
power inequities and barriers to success from roles of power imbalance.
3
Although these two recent examples do not bring to light the underlying
assumption, explicitly therein lies a subvert influence in the
relationship between European settlers and Indigenous peoples of
Turtle Island (North America). Additionally, because of this assumption
as a subvert influence, treaties have been repeatedly broken,
sovereignty has been continually diminished, Indigenous rights are
being eroded daily, and languages are being lost.
B. Colonizing Language
Nowhere is the loss of Native language and meaning more apparent
than when courts must interpret the legal rights reserved by American
Indian4 tribes. For the first half of the United States' existence, and
Great Britain before, the preferred method of colonizing North America
was through government-to-government agreements: treaties and
congressionally ratified agreements. At their core, the bargain struck in
those agreements was simple; the United States wanted Indian land
and Indian people wanted to preserve their way of life. Nonetheless,
1 C.S. Mantyka-Pringle et al., Commentary: Honouring Indigenous Treaty Rights for
Climate Justice, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 798 (2015).
2 Id. at 800.
3 Derek Armitage et al., Co-management and the Co-production of Knowledge: Learn-
ing to Adapt in Canada's Arctic, 21 GLOBAL ENvTL. CHANGE 995, 996-97 (2011).
4 There is an ongoing debate on the use of the word "Indian" to describe a diverse con-
tinent and islands of Indigenous peoples. The authors are using the language of the time
as this terminology is evolving. See Russell Means, I am an American Indian, not a Native
American!, https://perma.cc/T55D-RTAR (last visited Apr. 30, 2020).
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courts have struggled to give meaning to these agreements. Negotiators
spoke different languages, and because these agreements were always
drafted in the language of the colonizer, it is far from clear that actual
treaty terms matched tribal intent.5 The stark difference in worldviews
between colonizing and Indigenous peoples, and the privileging of the
English language, combined to distort meaning in the English
translation. Invariably, federal negotiators were, at best, recording what
they thought the Indians were trying to tell them, most likely what they
thought was best for the Indians, and-at worst-drafting the terms to
the detriment of the tribes.
In an effort to acknowledge these inequities, the United States
Supreme Court has a history, beginning with Chief Justice John
Marshall of articulating rules (canons) of interpretation of treaty
language and of employing those rules for the benefit of Tribes.6 Today,
the Indian canons of construction are black letter law, requiring that:
[T]reaties, agreements, statutes, and executive orders be liberally
construed in favor of the Indians and that all ambiguities are to be
resolved in their favor. In addition, treaties and agreements are to be
construed as the Indians would have understood them, and tribal property
rights and sovereignty are preserved unless Congress's intent to the
contrary is clear and unambiguous.7
The Court has rarely deviated from these rules, most often during
periods where the Court had justices taking a broad and protective view
of states' rights in the United States system of federalism. Most notable
are the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, both of which have adopted a
"new subjectivism in Indian law" whereby the Court "beg[a]n to depart
from [its] traditional standard, abandoning entrenched principles of
Indian law in favor of an approach that bends tribal sovereignty to fit
the Court's perceptions of non-Indian interests."8 While some viewed the
direction of the Rehnquist-Roberts Courts away from tribal sovereignty
and toward state jurisdiction as a sign of things to come, recent
rulings-most notably Herrera v. Wyoming9-suggests a renewed
understanding on the Court of the basis and importance of the canons of
5 ALVIN M. JOSEPHY, JR., THE NEZ PERCE INDIANS AND THE OPENING OF THE
NORTHWEST 318 (1965) (stating that the descriptions of the 1855 treaty negotiations at the
Council of Walla Walla indicate that negotiations were done in trade language and often
had to be interpreted through several translators to come close to the language of a par-
ticular Native language group represented at the Council).
6 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 550-56 (1832) (Worcester is considered the source
of the concept that treaty language must be interpreted as the Tribe would have under-
stood it. The majority opinion does not articulate the canon but applies the concept in find-
ing that the Cherokee Nation retained its sovereignty visa vie Georgia and that the laws
of Georgia do not apply.).
7 FELIX COHEN, COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 2.02 (2012).
8 David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the
Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1574 (1996).
9 139 S. Ct. 1686, 1686 (2019).
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construction and the need for federal mediation of state interference
with tribal sovereignty.
However, the Supreme Court's directive that treaties are to be
"construed as the Indians would have understood them,"10 simply begs
the questions of how tribal people understood-and understand-their
treaties. Judges today invariably share the same biases and cultural
misunderstandings of the federal negotiators of yesteryear. The purpose
of this Article is to begin bridging that gap so that courts may finally be
able to give meaning to the Supreme Court's canon of construction. To
begin that dialogue, this Article explores the canon of construction
requiring that treaty language be interpreted as the relevant tribe
would have understood it. Part II traces the judicial source and
reasoning for the canon, then discusses the sources of evidence that
courts have relied on in the decisions regarding tribal hunting and
fishing rights in the Pacific Northwest. Part III analyzes the role of
culture in the meaning of language and its manifestation in the relation
between traditional knowledge (TK)" and Native language referencing
place and the use of natural resources to shed light on what it means to
interpret treaty language as the tribe would have understood it. Part IV
concludes with thoughts on how courts may incorporate this more
complex understanding of the meaning of Indigenous language in its
interpretation of treaties as the tribes would have understood them.
Throughout this Article, we juxtapose the first-person narrative of our
lead author, Native scientist Sammy Matsaw, with the western legal
analysis of his co-authors as a stark reminder of the divide between the
two worldviews.
II. THE HISTORY, JUSTIFICATIONS, AND EVOLUTION OF THE CANNONS OF
CONSTRUCTION
The foundations of federal Indian law are as old as our Republic.
One of the earliest chief justices of the Supreme Court, John Marshall,
authored three opinions that would become known as the foundations of
United States Federal Indian Law and are referred to as "the Marshall
trilogy." 12 The first, Johnson v. M'Intosh,13 although primarily known
(and criticized) for the "Discovery Doctrine" justifying acquisition of land
through conquest, is of importance to the issues surrounding treaties in
10 COHEN, supra note 7, at 114.
11 Here, the use of Traditional Knowledge (TK or Indigenous Knowledge, IK) refers to
the well-developed philosophies or conceptual frameworks, ethics, and values that had
flourished for thousands of years. Its use is intentional, denoting the broader context of
knowledge underpinning the languages of Indigenous peoples however they are under-
standing TK/IK usage from their homelands. Similar to the broader context of Western
knowledge, although, differing in how knowledge is gained and shared; a knowledge that
originates from and has relationality with plants, animals, waterways, and lands (all of
creation) evolving over space and time.
12 Id. at 251 n.73.
13 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
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its conclusion that only the federal government (as opposed to private
citizens) may acquire land from an Indian tribe.14 The second, Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia,15 although a case that was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, would become known for its articulation in dicta of the trust
relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes stating:
"[Indian tribes] may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic
dependent nations. . . . Their relation to the United States resembles
that of a ward to his guardian."16 The paternalistic "ward/guardian"
language used in Cherokee Nation has allowed the Court to change the
scope of the federal trust responsibility over time, which has often
oscillated congruent with federal policy. During some eras, the Court
has articulated the relationship as a trust, whereby the . federal
government is obligated to protect the sovereign prerogatives of the
tribes.17 At other times, however, the court has shifted to the
"ward/guardian" language to justify abrogation of tribal sovereignty and
near complete federal control over Indian affairs.18 After the false starts
in both M'Intosh and Cherokee Nation, the third case, Worcester v.
Georgia,19 is credited as the point where the Court finally set out the
foundational rules that we now know as federal Indian Law. Among
other things, the case is credited as the source of the concept that treaty
language must be interpreted as the Tribe would have understood it.
The majority opinion does not articulate the canon but applies the
concept in finding that the Cherokee Nation retained its sovereignty vis-
a-vis Georgia and that the laws of Georgia do not apply to the Tribe.20 In
writing for the majority, Justice Marshall states that:
Not well acquainted with the exact meaning of words, nor supposing it to
be material whether they were called the subjects, or the children of their
father in Europe; lavish in professions of duty and affection, in return for
the rich presents they received; so long as their actual independence was
untouched, and their right to self government acknowledged, they were
willing to profess dependence on the power which furnished supplies of
which they were in absolute need, and restrained dangerous intruders
14 Id. at 592 ("The absolute ultimate title has been considered as acquired by discovery,
subject only to the Indian title of occupancy, which title the discoverers possessed the ex-
clusive right of acquiring.").
15 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
16 Id. at 17.
17 See e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 35 U.S. 515 (1832); Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556
(1883); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n., 411
U.S. 164 (1973).
18 See e.g., Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 1; United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375
(1886); Ward v. Race Horce, 163 U.S. 504 (1896); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553
(1903); Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544 (1981).
19 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
20 Id. at 521.
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from entering their country: and this was probably the sense in which the
term was understood by them.2 1
It is in the concurrence by Justice McLean that the actual canon is
found:
The language used in treaties with the Indians should never be construed
to their prejudice. If words be made use of which are susceptible of a more
extended meaning than their plain import, as connected with the tenor of
the treaty, they should be considered as used only in the latter sense. ...
How the words of the treaty were understood by this unlettered people,
rather than their critical meaning, should form the rule of construction.
22
Over time, the manner in which the Court has applied this canon of
construction gave rise to a variety of justifications for its use. The
practice in international law of interpreting ambiguity against the party
whose language the agreement is drafted in provides a legal basis for
the canon,23 as well as providing an explanation for why tribal intent is
not considered if the court deems the language unambiguous.
24
However, cases indicate a more normative basis for the canons of
construction that are unique to the relationship between the United
States and Indian tribes.
First, while relying on the differences between English (the written
language of the treaties) and the various tribal languages, courts have
gone to great lengths to describe the multiple steps in translation to get
from English to the language of a particular band of Indians,25 and the
frequent use of "trade" language for translation26-a language best
suited to cost negotiation as opposed to homeland designation and
reservation of rights. This practice stands in stark contrast to the
recording of the Treaty of Waitangi between the British and the Maori
people of New Zealand in both English and Maori languages,27 and
recognizes the greater disadvantage to people without a written
language and without translators familiar with the variety of native
languages represented in negotiations.
Second, the Supreme Court has gone beyond the recognition of a
mere language barrier to refer to the "superior" power of the federal
21 Id. at 546-47.
22 Id. at 582 (McLean, J., concurring).
23 Richard B. Collins, Indian Consent to American Government, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 365,
379 (1989) ("Treaty interpretation in international law seeks to give effect to the parties'
intent. When the treaty memorial is in the language of one party, at best imperfectly un-
derstood by the other, it is well established that the other party's understanding should
define the scope of interpretation.").
24 Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Na-
ture of Federal Indian Law, 78 CALIF. L. REv. 1137, 1141 (1990).
25 See United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 356 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
26 Id.
27 Treaty of Cession, Gr. Brit.-N.Z., Feb. 5, 1840, 29 B.S.P. 1111 [hereinafter Treaty of
Waitangi] (treaty text in both languages can be found at https://perma.cc/93DC-PBY4).
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government in negotiation with an "unlettered people."28 Thus, while
the canon may appear to be about translation issues, these references
suggest the Court considers it further evidence of unequal bargaining
power.29 Scholars have considered this basis as an aspect of the trust
doctrine in recognizing the need to protect tribes from the overreach of
state government and settlers.30
Third, and possibly most importantly, the Supreme Court has
indicated that the canon is necessary if we are to assume good faith on
the part of the federal negotiator (and by implication, allow the Court to
uphold the validity of the treaties).31 The strongest statement of this
occurs in Winters v. United States32 in which Justice McKenna writing
for the majority states:
The Indians had command of the lands and the waters-command of all
their beneficial use, whether kept for hunting, "and grazing roving herds of
stock," or turned to agriculture and the arts of civilization. Did they give
up all this? Did they reduce the area of their occupation and give up the
waters which made it valuable or adequate? .. . If it were possible to
believe affirmative answers, we might also believe that the Indians were
awed by the power of the Government or deceived by its negotiators. Neither
view is possible. The Government is asserting the rights of the Indians. But
extremes need not be taken into account. By a rule of interpretation of
agreements and treaties with the Indians, ambiguities occurring will be
resolved from the standpoint of the Indians.33
Scholars relate this basis to the discomfort of the Court with the
absence of consent on the part of Indian tribes to the assertion of the
plenary power of Congress over their rights.34 Professor Frickey notes
28 See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380 (1905) (first quoting Choctaw Nation
v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 28 (1886); then quoting Worcester, 31 U.S. 515, 582 (1832)).
29 Jill De La Hunt, Note, The Canons of Indian Treaty and Statutory Construction: A
Proposal for Codification, 17 J.L. REFORM 681, 681 (1984).
30 Id.; Frickey, supra note 24, at 1176-77; David M. Blurton, Canons of Construction,
Stare Decisis and Dependent Indian Communities: A Test of Judicial Integrity, 16 ALASKA
L. REV. 37, 44 (1999). The trust doctrine as justification for the canons of construction is
considered particularly relevant in their extension to statutes. Id. at 43. This Article will
not address that extension which does not include the canon to interpret as the Indians
would have understood the language.
31 See De La Hunt, supra note 29, at 687-88; Frickey, supra note 24, at 1177.
32 207 U.S. 564 (1908)
33 Id. at 576.
34 Collins, supra note 23, at 379; Frickey, supra note 24, at 1141 (noting that "[t]he ex-
tent to which the canons actually soften the impact of the doctrine is subject to debate");
Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and In-
terpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 383 (1993); Scott C. Hall, The
Indian Law Canons of Construction v. The Chevron Doctrine: Congressional Intent and the
Unambiguous Answer to the Ambiguous Problem, 37 CONN. L. REV. 495, 516 (2004) (noting
that "[w]hile Justice Marshall accepted the discovery of America as a 'conquest' that gave
legal rights to the colonizers, Marshall invoked the Indian law canons to safeguard against
inadvertent loss of Indian sovereignty. Marshall thus tempered U.S. power with responsi-
bility, creating a kind of 'conqueror with a conscience."').
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the inconsistency of plenary power with the concept of democracy
stating:
Even minimal reflection upon the tension between colonization and
American constitutionalism should uncover the foundational place federal
Indian law occupies in public law. A country that prides itself on following
the rule of law, the justifications for colonization uttered by those
European explorers and recognized by the Supreme Court itself-to impose
Christianity upon the heathen, to make more productive use of natural
resources, and so on-do not go down easily in the late-twentieth century.
35
This appeal to higher principles should not mask the fact that the
Court, lower federal courts, and state courts have been uneven in their
application of the canons of construction for Indian treaties. While some
of the variation has been explained by the substance of the specific
litigation with courts more likely to rely on the canons in reference to
traditional practices such as hunting and fishing, but to avoid them in
jurisdictional battles that would limit state sovereignty36 or the civil
rights of non-Indians within the boundaries of a reservation.37 But these
lines do not always explain the variation. Sadly, some of the variation
appears related to the political views of the authoring justice on the role
of federalism.
One stark example of this is the Court's jurisprudence during the
allotment-assimilation era from the 1880s through the early twentieth
century. Following the assimilationist policies of the federal executive
and legislative branches, the Supreme Court oscillated between opinions
recognizing and abrogating tribal sovereignty during this period.38 Often
leading the assimilationist effort of the Court during this era was
Justice Edward White,39 who has the dubious distinction of having
written the majority opinion in both Ward v. Race Horse,40 as well as
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.41 These opinions are infamous for turning their
35 Frickey, supra note 34, at 383.
36 Samuel E. Ennis, Implicit Divestiture and the Supreme Court's (Re)Construction of
the Indian Canons, 35 VT. L. REV. 623, 653 (2011).
37 Frickey, supra note 24, at 1200.
38 Compare Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905), with Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. 553 (1903)
39 Prior to service on the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Edward White had fought for
the Confederacy. History of the Court: Edward Douglass White, 1910-1921, SUPREME
COURT HISTORICAL Soc'Y, https://perma.cc/7F7K-BQKW (last visited Apr. 18, 2020). He
and his father, a plantation owner and Governor of Louisiana, believed strongly in state's
rights. Edward Douglass White, ENCYc. BRITANNICA (Jan. 10, 2020),
https://perma.cc/S9XE-K54F; Steven E. Silvern, Scales of Justice: Law, American Indian
Treaty Rights and the Political Construction of Scale, 18 POL. GEOGRAPHY 639, 648 (1999)
("Both federal and state courts gave legal legitimacy to these scalar perceptions and inter-
pretations of the prominence of state rights, the elimination of Indian political autonomy
and the termination of Indian treaty rights.").
40 163 U.S. 504, 507 (1896).
41 187 U.S. at 563. Justice White also joined the majority opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896), a landmark case challenging and upholding a Louisiana law compel-
ling segregation on railway cars. Not until 1954 was this reasoning and Plessy resounding-
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back on the principles laid out in the Marshall Trilogy and instead
basing their holdings on the assimilationist and colonialist rhetoric that
prevailed in that day. For example, Justice White based his holding in
Lone Wolf-that Congress may unilaterally abrogate treaties it had
entered into with American Indian Tribes-on his view that "[t]hey are
communities dependent on the United States. Dependent largely for
their daily food. Dependent for their political rights."42
Previously, in 1896, Justice White found that Congress had
extinguished the off-reservation hunting rights of the Shoshone-
Bannock Tribes on the entry of Wyoming to the Union. 43 Many western
states were admitted to the Union through congressional acts that
expressly disclaimed any right of the fledgling state to control Indian
lands or affairs.44 However, the Wyoming Organic Act did not contain
any language related to Indian tribes.45 That silence created an
ambiguity in the mind of Justice White, who was tasked with
determining whether Congress intended the rights guaranteed to the
Shoshone-Bannock by treaty in 1868 survived Wyoming statehood just
twelve years later in 1890. Ignoring the canons that should have
controlled, Justice White instead found that survival of those hunting
rights:
[W]ould ... render necessary the assumption that congress [sic], while
preparing the way, by the treaty, for new settlements and new states, yet
created a provision, not only detrimental to their future well-being, but
also irreconcilably in conflict with the powers of the states already
existing.46
In so doing, Justice White not only ignored the rule that ambiguities are
to be resolved in favor of tribal rights but found that those rights could
be implicitly abrogated in favor of the rights of newly created states.
The Supreme Court's brief, but damaging, turn away from the
entire body of Indian law-including the canons-ended shortly after
the Court's decision in Lone Wolf. This is not necessarily because the
Court had a change of heart, but because it largely stopped taking
Indian law cases. By this time, tribal sovereignty had reached its nadir
while federal control over Indian affairs, tribes, and people had reached
ly rejected in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), holding that "in the field
of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal." Id. at 495.
42 Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 567.
43 Race Horse, 163 U.S. at 509.
44 See David E. Wilkins, Tribal-State Affairs: American States as 'Disclaiming'
Sovereigns, 28 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM, Fall 1998, at 55.
45 Id. Professor David Wilkins suggests that Congress did not include a disclaimer be-
cause Wyoming's "territorial governments launched statehood and proposed constitutions
that were largely in compliance with federal policies," including a disclaimer in the Wyo-
ming Constitution that mirrors those found in the enabling acts of other states. Id.
46 Race Horse, 163 U.S. at 509.
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its zenith. This was the era where Indian agents were described as
"reservation Czars"47 and the President would appoint individual tribal
members as "chief for a day," just long enough to sign whatever legal
documents were put in front of them.48
Things began to slowly change by the 1920s. First came the Meriam
Report, which helped to precipitate the Indian Reorganization Act.
49
Then, after World War II, wherein American Indians served at higher
per-capita rates than any other group,5
0 Indian Country was galvanized
by the coming of the federal termination policy.
51 The result was a
concerted effort by tribal people to have their rights and sovereignty
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court.52
That effort culminated with the Supreme Court returning to its
roots in 1959 with its unanimous decision in Williams v. Lee.
53 There, in
a case about whether a state court may assume jurisdiction over an on-
reservation contract dispute between an Indian and a non-Indian, the
Court reaffirmed Worcester, calling it "one of [Chief Justice John
Marshall's] most courageous and eloquent decisions."
54 Although the
Court acknowledged that "[o]ver the years this Court has modified these
principles in cases where essential tribal relations were not involved
and where the rights of Indians would not be jeopardized, but the basic
policy of Worcester has remained."55 And with that, the Court ushered
in what has been referred to as the "modern era" of federal Indian law,
56
by returning to first principles and reaffirming tribal sovereignty; "the
broad principles of [Worcester] came to be accepted as law."
57
The modern era came to an abrupt end with the appointment of
William Rehnquist to replace Warren Earl Burger as Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court. Dean David Getches marks this point as the
adoption by the Court of a "new subjectivism in Indian law" whereby the
Court "began to depart from [its] traditional standard, abandoning
entrenched principles of Indian law in favor of an approach that bends
47 DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 221 (7th
ed. 2017).
48 ROBERT J. CONLEY, CHEROKEE THOUGHTS: HONEST & UNCENSORED 43 (2008).
49 LEWIS MERIAM, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION (1928); 25 U.S.C.
§§ 5101-5144.
50 Thomas D. Morgan, Native Americans in World War II, ARMY HISTORY, Fall 1995, at
22.
51 See Getches, supra note 8, at 1591.
52 See generally CHARLES F. WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN
INDIAN NATIONS 57-112 (2005); see also VINE DELORIA JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS
54-77 (Univ. of Okla. Press 1988) (1969).
53 See Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (holding that Arizona courts are not free to exercise ju-
risdiction over civil suits by one who is not an Indian against an Indian where cause of
action arises on Indian reservation).
54 Id. at 219.
55 Id.
56 CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 1 (1987); see also
Getches, supra note 8, at 1574, n.3.
57 Lee, 358 U.S. at 219.
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tribal sovereignty to fit the Court's perceptions of non-Indian
interests."58 The cornerstone of Chief Justice Rehnquist's "subjectivist"
approach was to "[r]etreat from the established canons of construction,"
by simply "dismiss [ing] the canons by declaring that no true ambiguity
exists."59
The Court's recent decision in Herrera, however, provides a
glimmer of hope.60 Clayvin- Herrera is a member of the Crow Tribe, a
nation that has long inhabited the central portion of what is today called
Montana and Wyoming.61 Among other treaties, the Crows entered into
the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie, wherein it ceded over 30 million acres
to the United States and promised it would make "no permanent
settlement" outside of the Crow Reservation.6 2 No payment was made
for this land by the United States. Instead, the United States agreed to
provide a few buildings, clothing, implements, and other goods
necessary for agriculture.63 Additionally, the United States agreed that,
"[t]he Indians ... shall have the right to hunt on the unoccupied lands
of the United States so long as game may be found thereon, and as long
as peace subsists among whites and Indians on the borders of the
hunting districts."6 4
This promise would not last thirty years before it was partially
abrogated by the Supreme Court in Race Horse.65 There, the Court was
interpreting the 1868 Treaty of Fort Bridger between the United States
and the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, which contained language identical
to Article IV of the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie.66 In a decision that was
entirely contrary to traditional principles of federal Indian law, the
Court concluded that Congress had implicitly abrogated Article IV by
admitting the State of Wyoming into the Union "on equal terms with the
other states."67 The Court's reasoning was two-fold. First, it found that
because Article IV contained conditions whereby the treaty right would
be reduced or lost, the right was not permanent but "essentially
perishable" and "temporary and precarious."6 8 Second, the Court applied
the equal footing doctrine and reasoned that if the treaty right of the
Shoshone-Bannocks continued after statehood, "Wyoming, then, will
have been admitted into the Union, not as an equal member, but as one
58 Getches, supra note 8, at 1574.
59 Id. at 1620-22; see also, Ralph W. Johnson & Berrie Martinis, Chief Justice
Rehnquist and the Indian Cases 16 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1, 18 (1995) (noting that under
Rehnquist the Court often "interpreted what seems an ambiguous statute against Indian
interests.").
60 Herrera, 139 S. Ct. 1686, 1686 (2019).
61 Id. at 1691.
62 Id. at 1692; Treaty with the Crows, art. II, May 7, 1868, 15 Stat. 649.
63 Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1692-93.
64 Id. at 1693 (quoting Treaty with the Crows, supra note 62, at 650).
65 Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896).
66 Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1694.
67 Race Horce, 163 U.S. at 514.
68 Id. at 515.
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shorn of a legislative power vested in all the other states of the Union."
69
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Race Horse abrogating the Shoshone-
Bannock's off-reservation hunting right in Wyoming was subsequently
extended to the Crow Tribe's off-reservation hunting rights by the Tenth
Circuit in the 1995 case, Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis.70
'The Supreme Court's 1999 decision in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs
Band of Chippewa Indians,71 however, breathed new life into the Crow
Tribe's off-reservation hunting rights. At issue in that case was whether
a number of bands of Chippewa continued to have usufructuary rights
in lands ceded by the Tribe in 1837.72 The State of Minnesota argued
that "the Indians lost these rights through an Executive Order in 1850,
an 1855 Treaty, and the admission of Minnesota into the Union in
1858."73 In a decision remarkable for its deviation from the Rehnquist
Court's typical "subjectivist approach" to Indian law cases,
74 Justice
69 Id. at 514.
70 73 F.3d 982 (1995).
71 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
72 Id. at 176.
73 Id.
74 The decision is particularly noteworthy for its treatment of the 1855 Treaty. That
treaty included a sweeping cession:
The Mississippi, Pillager, and Lake Winnibigoshish bands of Chippewa Indians
hereby cede, sell, and convey to the United States all their right, title, and interest
in, and to, the lands now owned and claimed by them, in the Territory of Minnesota,
and included within the following boundaries, viz: [describing territorial bounda-
ries]. And the said Indians do further fully and entirely relinquish and convey to
the United States, any and all right, title, and interest, of whatsoever nature the
same may be, which they may now have in, and to any other lands in the Territory
of Minnesota or elsewhere.
Id. at 184. That cession included the lands where the Tribe's usufructuary rights had been
reserved in 1837. The State of Minnesota argued that this was unambiguous language of
cession. The Court, however, found that:
This sentence, however, does not mention the 1837 Treaty, and it does not mention
hunting, fishing, and gathering rights. The entire 1855 Treaty, in fact, is devoid of
any language expressly mentioning-much less abrogating-usufructuary rights.
Id. at 195. As a backstop to this, the Court went on to note:
[T]o determine whether this language abrogates Chippewa Treaty rights, we look
beyond the written words to the larger context that frames the Treaty, including
"the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted
by the parties.
Id. at 196 (quoting Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432 (1943)). The Court
then analyzed the language of the Act authorizing the 1855 Treaty negotiations, the nego-
tiation instructions, and the negotiation transcript to determine whether either the United
States or the Tribe understood the Treaty to include a cession of off-reservation usufructu-
ary rights. See id. at 197-99. Ultimately, the Court concluded:
[T]he historical record provides no support for the theory that the second sentence
of Article 1 was designed to abrogate the usufructuary privileges guaranteed under
the 1837 Treaty, but it does support the theory that the Treaty, and Article 1 in
particular, was designed to transfer Chippewa land to the United States. At the
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O'Connor found that none of these events abrogated the Tribe's
usufructuary rights.
Important for our purposes, Mille Lacs systematically
deconstructed the twin-pillars of the Race Horse decision.75 First, the
Court dismissed the notion that treaty rights can be "temporary and
precarious," finding that such an approach is "too broad to be useful."76
Second, the Court "entirely rejected the 'equal footing' reasoning applied
in Race Horse."77 Race Horse's equal footing analysis was premised on
the notion that tribal usufructuary rights cannot be reconciled with
state sovereignty and therefore, newly admitted states should not be
burdened with treaty rights that do not exist in the original states.78
The Mille Lacs Court found this to be a "false premise."79 Pointing to a
bevy of cases decided subsequent to Race Horse,80 the Court concluded:
[A]n Indian tribe's treaty rights to hunt, fish, and gather on state land are
not irreconcilable with a State's sovereignty over the natural resources of
the State. Rather, Indian treaty rights can coexist with state management
of natural resources. Although States have important interests in
regulating wildlife and natural resources within their borders, this
authority is shared with the Federal Government when the Federal
Government exercises one of its enumerated constitutional powers, such as
treaty making.81
Rather than adopt the misguided analysis from Race Horse, the Court
refocused on the proper analysis based upon foundation principles:
"[Mille Lacs] drew on numerous decisions issued since Race Horse to
explain that Congress 'must clearly express' any intent to abrogate
Indian treaty rights. The Court found no such 'clear evidence' in the Act
admitting Minnesota to the Union, which was 'silent' with regard to
Indian treaty rights."82
very least, the historical record refutes the State's assertion that the 1855 Treaty
"unambiguously" abrogated the 1837 hunting, fishing, and gathering privileges.
Given this plausible ambiguity, we cannot agree with the State that the 1855 Trea-
ty abrogated Chippewa usufructuary rights.
Id. at 200.
75 Id. at 203-08.
76 Id. at 206.
77 Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1686.
78 See Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 514 (1896).
79 Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
80 Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658 (1979); Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920); Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976); Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); United
States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188 (1876); Menominee Tribe of Indians
v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
81 Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 204.
82 Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1696 (citations omitted) (quoting Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 202)
(citing United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738-40 (1986); Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443
U.S. at 690; Menominee, 391 U.S. at 413).
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That is how things stood until Clayvin Herrera followed a herd of
elk across the boundary of the Crow Reservation into Wyoming's Big
Horn National Forest.83 He was charged by the State of Wyoming with
taking elk out-of-season and without a state license.
84 Herrera
attempted to base his defense at trial on Article IV of the 1868 Treaty of
Fort Laramie.8 5 However, the trial court prohibited him from making a
treaty-based defense and he was convicted.86 Herrera raised the same
defense on appeal, but the Wyoming state appellate court found that
Mille Lacs had not entirely repudiated Race Horse and that Mr. Herrera
was precluded from raising a treaty-based defense after the Crow lost
the same argument in Repsis.87
The Supreme Court made short work of these arguments.88 First,
after reaffirming the analysis from Mille Lacs, the Court clarified:
We thus formalize what is evident in Mille Lacs itself. While Race Horse
"was not expressly overruled" in Mille Lacs "it must be regarded as
retaining no vitality" after that decision. To avoid any future confusion, we
make clear today that Race Horse is repudiated to the extent it held that
treaty rights can be impliedly extinguished at statehood.
89
The Court's repudiation of Race Horse fed directly into whether Mr.
Herrera was precluded from making his treaty-based defense. The
Court began by acknowledging that "[u]nder the doctrine of issue
preclusion 'a prior judgment . . . foreclos[es] successive litigation of an
issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a [previous
case]."'90 However, an important exception exists where "there has been
an intervening 'change in [the] applicable legal context."'
91 Looking to its
treatment of Race Horse, the Court concluded that "this is not a
marginal case. At a minimum, a repudiated decision does not retain
preclusive force."9 2 As a result, the Court moved on to the merits of Mr.
Herrera's treaty-based defense.
On the merits, the Court refocused the inquiry onto foundation
principles:
If Congress seeks to abrogate treaty rights, "it must clearly express its
intent to do so." "There must be 'clear evidence that Congress actually
considered the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and
83 Id. at 1706.
84 Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1693.
85 Id.; Treaty of Fort Laramie, Sioux-U.S., Apr. 29, 1868.
86 Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1693.
87 Id. at 1693-94.
88 Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1694.
89 Id. at 1686 (quoting Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353, 361 (1984)).
90 Id. (second and third alteration in original) (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532
U.S. 742, 748-49 (2001)).
91 Id. at 1690 (quoting Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825, 834 (2009)).
92 Id. at 1698.
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Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by
abrogating the treaty."' 93
The Court looked to three places to determine whether the requisite
"clear evidence" might exist in this case.94 First, it looked to the
language of the Wyoming Statehood Act; second, to the 1868 Treaty of
Fort Laramie; and finally, to the historical record.95
Looking to the Wyoming Statehood Act, the Court reiterated the
foundational rule that the presumption is that treaty rights remain
unless expressly abrogated. Looking to this rule, the Court found the
Statehood Act "'makes no mention of Indian treaty rights' and 'provides
no clue that Congress considered the reserved rights of the [Crow Tribe]
and decided to abrogate those rights when it passed the Act."' 96 As a
result, unlike Race Horse, where the Court presumed the termination of
the Shoshone-Bannock's treaty rights at Wyoming statehood, the Court
here found "[t]here simply is no evidence that Congress intended to
abrogate the 1868 Treaty right through the Wyoming Statehood Act,
much less the 'clear evidence' this Court's precedent requires."97
The Court next considered whether the 1868 Treaty of Fort
Laramie expressed an intent for the Crow Tribe's off-reservation
hunting rights to expire upon Wyoming's statehood. Recall that the
Court in Race Horse described the identical language found in the 1868
Fort Bridger Treaty to be "essentially perishable" and "temporary and
precarious."98 That reasoning was repudiated by the Court in both Mille
Lacs and Herrera. Instead, the Court returned once again to foundation
principles, this time to reiterate that treaties must be interpreted
consistent with the canons of construction:
A treaty is "essentially a contract between sovereign nations." Indian
treaties "must be interpreted in light of the parties' intentions, with any
ambiguities resolved in favor of the Indians," and the words of the treaty
must be construed "in the sense in which they would naturally be
understood by the Indians."99
The Court found that the Treaty itself listed out the conditions upon
which the Treaty hunting right would be terminated and found that
"Wyoming's statehood does not appear on this list."100 The Court
likewise applied the canons to its analysis of the historical record. After
sifting through the record as presented by both parties, the Court
93 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 526 U.S. 172, 203 (1999)).
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. (quoting Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 203).
97 Id. at 1698-99 (quoting Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 203).
98 Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 515 (1896).




concluded "the historical record is by no means clear."
101 The Court then
properly resolved this ambiguity in favor of the Tribe.
102 Ultimately, the
Court found:
Applying Mille Lacs, this is not a hard case. The Wyoming Statehood Act
did not abrogate the Crow Tribe's hunting right, nor did the 1868 Treaty
expire on its own accord at that time. The treaty itself defines the
circumstances in which the right will expire. Statehood is not one of
them.103
A second question addressed by the Court was whether Crow tribal
members had lost their right to hunt within the Bighorn National
Forest, the location where Mr. Herrera had been hunting.
104 Recall that
the treaty right reserved by the Crow Tribe in 1868 was the right to
"hunt on the unoccupied lands of the United States."
105 Wyoming argued
that lands reserved by the United States as national forests were
categorically "occupied" as that term was contemplated in the treaty.
106
In addressing this question, the Court once again relied upon the canons
of construction, holding that "[t]reaty analysis begins with the text, and
treaty terms are construed as 'they would naturally be understood by
the Indians."'0 7 The Court construed the treaty by examining its text
and the circumstances surrounding the treaty's creation and ultimately
concluded that "the Crow Tribe would have understood the word
'unoccupied' to denote an area free of residence or settlement by non-
Indians."108 As a result, the Court found: "Considering the terms of the
1868 Treaty as they would have been understood by the Crow Tribe, we
conclude that the creation of Bighorn National Forest did not remove
the forest lands, in their entirety, from the scope of the treaty."1
09
The Court was careful to note two limitations on its holding,
however. First, it noted that "not that all areas within the [national]
forest[s] are unoccupied. On remand, the State may argue that the
specific site where Herrera hunted elk was used in such a way that it
was 'occupied' within the meaning of the 1868 Treaty."11
0 Second, the
Court noted that "[o]n remand, the State may press its arguments as to
why the application of state conservation regulations to Crow Tribe
101 Id. at 1700.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 1700-01.
105 Id. at 1693 (quoting Treaty with the Crow Indians, art. IV, May 7, 1868, 15 Stat.
650).
106 Id. at 1701 n.5.
107 Id. (quoting Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 676 (1979)).
108 Id. at 1701-02.
109 Id. at 1703.
110 Id. (citing State v. Cutler, 109 Idaho 448 (1985)).
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members exercising the 1868 Treaty right is necessary for
conservation."1
The Court's turn back to the canons of construction in Herrera is
significant. However, as the late Professor Philip Frickey has observed,
"[c]anons are mere formulations. Standing alone, a canon cannot be
expected to control judicial outcome, particularly in a context removed
from the one that gave birth to the canon."112 In other words,
reaffirming these canons simply begs the question: how do we know how
a tribe would have interpreted their treaty?
III. LINGUISTICS AND THE RELATION BETWEEN TRADITIONAL ECOLOGICAL
KNOWLEDGE AND NATIVE LANGUAGE REFERRING TO PLACE
A. Cultural Linguistics and Legal Evidence for the Meaning of Language
The ultimate goal for treaty interpretation is to understand the
intent of both the United States and the tribe in negotiating and
executing the treaty.113 That understanding is typically developed
through examination of three separate but intertwined sources of
information: 1) the document itself, 2) the circumstances surrounding
the development of the document, and 3) the history of the tribe that is
party to the treaty.1 1 4 The evidence brought to bear toward each of these
sources of information is filtered through the canons. The treaty is to be
viewed "'with any ambiguities resolved in favor of the Indians,' and the
words of a treaty must be construed 'in the sense in which they would
naturally be understood by the Indians."'115
111 Id.
112 Frickey, supra note 34, at 428.
113 Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 675-76 (1979).
114 See Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1905); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564,
575-77 (1908); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598-600 (1963); Menominee, 391 U.S.
404, 406 (1968); Antoine, 420 U.S. 194, 197-200 (1975); Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S.
at 664-670; Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172, 196 (1999); Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262,
265-73 (2001); Wash. State Dep't of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1000, 1011-
13 (2018); Herrera, 139 S.Ct. at 1698-1700; see also Kimball v. Callahan, 493 F.2d 564,
566 (9th Cir. 1974); Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47 (9th Cir. 1981)
("To identify the purposes for which the Colville Reservation was created, we consider the
document and circumstances surrounding its creation, and the history of the Indians for
whom it was created."); United States v. Adair 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting that
water rights case "depends on an analysis of the intent of the parties to the ... [t]reaty, as
reflected in its text and surrounding circumstances."); United States v. Washington, 853
F.3d 946, 963 (9th Cir. 2018); United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp 312, 360-50
(W.D. Wash. 1974) (including analysis on "Pretreaty Role of Fishing Among Northwest
Indians," "Treaty Background," "Negotiation and Execution of the Treaties," and "Post-
Treaty Indian Fishing."); Kiamath & Modoc Tribes v. Maison, 139 F. Supp. 634, 636 (D.
Or. 1956).
115 Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1699 (first quoting Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 676,
then quoting Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 206).
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Courts rely on expert testimony from linguists to determine how a
tribe would have understood the terms of their treaty. The 1972 Idaho
Supreme Court case State v. Tinno
1 16 provides a textbook example of
how linguistics has been used to interpret treaties.
117 The Court there
was considering the meaning of Article IV of the Treaty of Fort Bridger
with the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes.
118 Again, that treaty included the
promise that the Tribes "shall have the right to hunt on the unoccupied
lands of the United States so long as game may be found thereon, and so
long as peace subsists among the whites and Indians on the borders of
the hunting districts."119 The question posed was whether "to hunt"
includes fishing.120 The court turned to the "expert testimony of Dr.
Sven S. Liljeblad, a professor of anthropology and linguistics at Idaho
State University, relating to the term 'to hunt' as the term was
generically used in the languages of the signatory Indians."
121 The
expert testified that neither the Shoshone Tribe nor the Bannock Tribe
separated hunting and fishing in their language; instead, the Shoshone
verb, tygi, and the Bannock verb, hoawai, both refer to the process of
obtaining wild food, whether fish, game, or plants.
122 The court also
considered notes taken by a United States General participating in the
negotiations indicating that both hunting and fishing were discussed.
123
Using this evidence, the court concluded that the words "to hunt" in the
treaty include a fishing right.
124
A similar approach was taken by the Supreme Court during the
2019 term in Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den,
Inc.125 The Court there sought to discern how the Yakama Nation would
have understood the term "in common with," as it related to the Nation's
treaty right to travel.126 Using linguistics, Justice Gorsuch found that
"[i]n the Yakama language, the term 'in common with' ... suggest[ed]
public use or general use without restriction."'
127 Based on this, the
Justice concluded "the evidence suggests that the Yakamas understood
the right-to-travel provision to provide them 'with the right to travel ...
without being subject to any licensing and permitting fees related to the
exercise of that right."'
1 28
116 State v. Tinno, 497 P.2d 1386 (Idaho 1972).
117 Id. at 1389.
118 Id.





124 Id. at 1390.
125 139 S. Ct. 1000, 1017 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
126 Id. at 1016.




2020] CULTURAL LINGUISTICS AND TREATY LANGUAGE
Notwithstanding these strong signals, courts have been spotty at
best in developing a rigorous methodology for discerning historical tribal
understanding of the terms of treaties. However, as more people with
Indigenous heritage have entered the academe, scholarship is moving
closer to an understanding of native language. This Section will focus on
the meaning of native words through the lens of cultural linguistics. The
part following this Section will turn to traditional ecological knowledge
to inform language reserving rights to use and occupy land and natural
resources. While the goal is to understand the meaning of treaty
language at the time it was written, that understanding must evolve as
new approaches to unpacking their meaning are developed.
One of many ways to honor the original intent of tribal people in
coming to these treaties is to better understand the words through their
eyes. Cultural linguistics provides us with that opportunity.
B. Ethno- and Cultural Linguistics
Cultural (and ethno-) linguistics explores how the interaction
among a group of people reflects their conceptualization of the world
around them.129 Scholars of cultural linguistics refer to language as the
"collective memory bank" of a people,130 reflecting "the cultural
knowledge that emerges from the interactions between members of a
cultural group across time and space."131 Cultural linguistics looks at
the emergent aspects of language including: 1) how language is used to
form mental models of what is observed in time and space in the world
around us as well as our own practices as a community of people and
reflects the shared assumptions about the meaning of language;132 2)
how language is used to reflect classification of concepts reflecting the
broader meaning associated with a single word;133 and 3) how
metaphors may reflect cultural understanding of ourselves and our
place in space and time.134
The authors do not claim expertise in cultural linguistics. Instead,
we refer to it as an example of the increasing understanding of the
depth of meaning in language. It represents a field of western science
struggling to translate meaning from the language of other cultures and
129 Farzad Sharifian, Cultural Linguistics, 28 ETHNOLINGUISTIC 33, 34 (2017); GARY B.
PALMER, TOWARD A THEORY OF CULTURAL LINGUISTICs 35, 37 (1996).
130 Id. at 38 (quoting NGOGI WA THIONG'O, DECOLONISING THE MIND: THE POLITIcS OF
LANGUAGE IN AFRICAN LITERATURE (1986)).
131 Id.
132 Id. at 40-41 (referred to as "cultural schema").
133 Id. at 43-45 (referred to as "cultural categories"). In reference to the noun classifica-
tion system of an aboriginal people in Australia, Sharifian states, "[t]his system of noun
classification is entrenched in Murrinh-patha cultural categorisation, which in turn is
based on the Murrinh-patha world-view. For instance, as Walsh argues, the fact that fresh
water, fire, and language are classified separately indicates that each holds a prominent
place in the culture of the Murrinh-patha." Id. at 44.
134 Id. at 45-46 (referred to as "cultural metaphors").
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may be useful in helping western judicial systems unpack that meaning.
While federal courts have long allowed oral history, anthropology, and
Native mythology to inform translation of Native language in court
proceedings,135 the fact that English language mental models do not
provide a cultural basis to understand this information as the Tribe
would, hinders the use of this information in judicial proceedings.
136
This notion of having to look beyond the so called "plain meaning" of
translated language is captured in the following statement about the
problems of intercultural communication:
In recent years several studies have shown that in certain contexts,
intercultural communication, and in particular miscommunication, reflect
differences in the ways in which various groups of speakers conceptualise
their experiences. In doing so they draw on their own cultural schemas,
categories, and metaphors. Wolf and Polzenhagen observe that "cross-
cultural variation at the conceptual level calls for a strongly meaning-
oriented and interpretive approach to the study of intercultural
communication" and that is what Cultural Linguistics has to offer.137
Similarly, Western science is beginning to acknowledge the value of
traditional ecological knowledge in providing a holistic approach to
understanding complex systems.138
Vignette by Sammy Matsaw: I was sitting in on a meeting as a program
manager for the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes' Fish and Wildlife department.
One of our elders and the director was talking about our treaty rights and
the differences between treaties of the lower [Columbia] river tribes i.e.
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla, Yakima, Nez Perce, and Warm
Springs. Their treaty language says, "to fish in common with settlers"
135 See, e.g., Tinno, 497 P.2d 1386, 1389 (Idaho 1972).
136 See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2007),
rev'd en banc, 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008).
137 Sharifian, supra note 129, at 49 (citation omitted). Sharifian goes on to note that in
the context of international negotiations:
they are very likely to need to convey cultural conceptualisation found in one lan-
guage by means of cultural conceptualisations found in another. In other words, the
process of translation or cross-cultural rendering of cultural conceptualisations can
be difficult since languages encode the culturally differentiated and hence histori-
cally entrenched ways in which speakers have conceptualised their world in the
past and continue to do so in the present. As a result, finding sets of words that suc-
cessfully capture equivalent cultural conceptualisations in another language can
become complicated, depending on the degree to which the two cultures have been
in contact and, as a result, have similar although perhaps not identical cultural
conceptualisations.
Id. at 53.
138 See, e.g., Deborah McGregor, Coming Full Circle: Indigenous Knowledge, Environ-
ment, and Our Future, 28 AM. INDIAN Q. 385, 385-410 (2003).
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while ours says "to hunt." During the Tinno case, Sveni39 said our
language for "to hunt" meant to gather wild foods. Of course, they're going
to listen to a white guy who is an expert in our language over our own
people? It was good either way because they understood our language
doesn't translate to English and we say to gather wild foods as in hunting,
fishing, trapping, and gathering our foods. But the old ones said it meant
more than that, it .meant to gather your things up, go out on the land,
camp, and gather wild foods.
To me when the more I talked with my own generation about the ideas in
tygi or hoawai, the Shoshone or Bannock word for "to hunt," respectively, it
seems there was so much more to our language. Language for Shoshone
and Bannock peoples, and Indigenous peoples of North America, are made
up of mostly verbs whereas English and Latin based languages are made
up of nouns. For example, in English one would call a writing utensil a
pen, a pencil, a marker and so on whereas with Shoshone-Bannocks we say
"gimme the thing to write with." When we talk about tygilhoawai it seems
there must be learning and teaching in there as well. Teaching and
learning about the seasonal round, the dances, the songs, the stories,
where to go, where to set up camp, what's there, what's in season, and so
on. Tygi and hoawai moved within and among the ceremonies of Shoshone
and Bannock ways of living in our sacred homelands and waterways. I can
imagine our ancestors deliberating the language of the treaties over the
years. I say treaties and years plural because the Fort Bridger Treaty of
1868 was among the dozens of previously negotiated treaties over decades
of settlers trying to come to an agreement with the local Tribes. How they
must've thought, "someday we can teach them about how to live within our
homelands through our ceremonies, teachings and way of life." Naive?
Maybe, maybe not.
The observations presented in the vignette above highlight the
many gaps in understanding that exist between Native and Eurocentric
worldviews. The first step toward filling these gaps-and thereby finally
honoring tribal intent when construing treaties-is to understand how
tribal people think differently than those from non-Indian communities.
Those differences are manifold, but we highlight three here: 1)
philosophical differences in time and space; 2) miscommunications
caused by direct translations; and 3) misunderstandings developed by
tribal use of verb-based thought worlds.
1. Philosophical Differences of Time and Space
Benjamin Whorf, an anthropologist and linguist, proposed a theory
of linguistic relativity through his studies of Mayan and Hopi languages.
He states:
139 Dr. Sven S. Liljeblad (1899-2000), was a professor of anthropology and linguistics at
Idaho State University who gave expert testimony of signatory tribes during Tinno, 497
P.2d 1386, 1389 (Idaho 1972).
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I find it gratuitous to assume that a Hopi who knows only the Hopi
language and the cultural ideas of his own society has the same notions,
often supposed to be intuitions, of time and space that we have, and that
are generally assumed to be universal. In particular, he has no general
notion or intuition of time as a smooth flowing continuum in which
everything in the universe proceeds at an equal rate, out of a future,
through a present, into a past; or, in which, to reverse the picture, the
observer is being carried in the stream of duration continuously away from
a past and into a future.
140
From this, Whorf goes on to distinguish the thoughts and ideas of Hopi
peoples' metaphysics, asserting that humans can come to similar views
of the universe through very different thought worlds. Joseph
Subbiondo, linguist and president of the California Institute of Integral
Studies, has found Whorf's writings and studied them in the context of
critiquing Western science notes:
Western culture has made, through language, a provisional analysis of
reality and, without correctives, holds resolutely to that analysis as final.
The only corrective lie in all those other tongues which by aeons of
independent evolution have arrived at different, but equally logical,
provisional analysis.141
Certain assumptions usually remain implicit in the language of English
speaking Euro-descended peoples-assumptions that do not challenge
the power, privilege, and land given to them by Indigenous peoples who
signed treaties.142 There is a bias in the implicit structure of English
speaking peoples shaping certain assumptions. In most cases these
certain types of assumptions are believed to be universal such that the
implicit idea of a scientist is usually a white male, in a white lab coat.
The implicit reality is that he is also believed to be cis-hetero male with
a wife and nuclear family, Christian, Anglo, patriot, middle-class, etc.
The uniformity is a part of the goal of scientific research in order to find
universally applied solutions, a monoculture of science and its
application. There is an interplay where science affects society and vice-
versa in unforeseen ways such that the implicit become ubiquitous. The
dangers of unquestioned assumptions imbedded in implicit meaning.
What assumptions are shaped by language and which are shaped by
methodology? If colonialism is a culture of colonizing Indigenous lands
and asserting a supremacy through one spoken language, does that
make Western frameworks (i.e., Western science) the best? Without any
140 Benjamin L. Whorf, An American Indian Model of the Universe, 16 INT'L J. AM.
LINGUISTICS 67, 67 (1950).
141 J.L. Subbiondo, Benjamin Lee Whorf's Theory of Language, Culture, and Conscious-
ness: A Critique of Western Science, 25 LANGUAGE & COMM. 149, 157 (2005),
https://perma.cc/G9VT:SVQZ.
142 See David A. Bell, Columbia River Treaty Renewal and Sovereign Tribal Authority
under the Stevens Treaty Right-to-Fish Clause, 36 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 270,
273-98 (2015).
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research or analysis into these linguistic assumptions, how would we
ever know?
2. Direct Translation Often Fails to Grasp Meaning
We do know that Indigenous languages are usually bounded by a
particular place. They are also verb-based because there was/is more
interest in processes and relationships (the use of past tense reflects the
extinction/endangerment of Indigenous languages happening today).
The idea, feeling, and conversation is not about an object per se but
about the processes of energy around a particular set of objects. For
instance, Kevin Locke (Lakota name: Thok6ya Inizii), meaning "The
First to Arise") is Lakota (Hunkpapa band) and Anishinaabe, a fluent
Lakota language speaker, and educator states the following:
Lakota is really specific in terms of the describing of different processes.
For instance, -hldA which means the idea to tear. If you tear something
with your fingers it's, yuhldA. If you tear something with your teeth,
yahledA. If you tear something with pressure, pahldA. If you tear
something with your foot, nahl MA. If the wind blows and tears something
its, woilddA. And it goes on, there's more than this. But I'm just trying to
emphasize the fact that the Lakh6ta language offers a different
perspective, a different angle on the world we live in.143
We can learn that Lakota language as Indigenous peoples reveals
another frame of thought focused on processes and relationships rather
than cause and effect and other categories as seen in English and other
European languages. In the Lakota language, there is more interest in
the processes of energy than there is in the object per se. If we were to
apply this to a network or food web analysis, we would see more interest
in the flow through nodes, not necessarily the nodes themselves. Thus,
it follows that we see ourselves as part of nature rather than separate
from nature. In contrast, English thinking speakers see categories and
therefore use a language to imply a discrete separation from nature.
3. Verb-Based Thought Worlds
The fixation on objects and seeing nature as objects creates a
divisiveness such as human-nature division or conflict. Where
civilization takes natural resources, converting nature for the needs of
humans in the view of nature providing ecosystem services, nature for
the Indigenous is viewed as one in the same:
"... all of nature is in me, and a bit of myself is in all of nature."144
143 DVD: Rising Voices / H6thaiiipi, Revitalizing the Lakota Language (Florentine
Films/Hott Productions, in association with The Language Conservancy, Dana Claxton,
Alayna Eagle Shield, Milt Lee & Yvonne Russo eds., 2015).




From this quote we were once more interested in the is, the being-
ness of life, our connection and fluidity between us and us between all of
creation. In a contemporary English lens of the world we are
preoccupied with the it, the object of life. The being-ness of life is where
we want to get back to, our languages and our way of thought. If the
being-ness of life is of interest and forms our ideas about science then
we have much to re-claim, to call our own. We have maintained a
hunting-gathering-fishing tie to the land that still informs our science
thinking and practice. Viola Cordova, the first Native American woman
to receive a Ph.D in philosophy, receiving it in 1992 from the University
of New Mexico. She states:
They saw themselves as existing in a web of highly interrelated and
interdependent "substances": air, water, other beings, and land. They
maintained their life force by ingesting the life force of other beings. No
less respect was due a wild onion than a deer. "Eat it," my father would say
to us, "we took its life that we might continue our own." Eating was a holy
sacrament; a thanksgiving to the creatures that provided us life.14
5
The teachings Viola is sharing in the quote above sheds light on the idea
of a matrices of thought underlying implicitly in the words from her
father. We would go a bit farther as to say that not all ideas need to be
said, as we understand one another's actions and it is those actions that
represent an unspoken truth of who we are. Language is vital and
necessary, but is not the end all, be all of reconnecting our thought
patterns with our reality and world.
C. Traditional Ecological Knowledge Shapes Mental Models of Nature
There are very few fluent speakers of Indigenous languages. Not to
say the impacts of the language do not remain, they do. Part of the
implicit nature of language is its spirit, and without being fluent in one's
language the spirit of the language lives on. The language is from the
land and when we go back out onto our homelands the language is
there. Similar to niche concept theory,146 a species will match to their
behavioral characteristics and genetic traits to their surrounding
environment, so do humans with language. Language, as a behavioral
characteristic, is a response of the lands we live within. Forcing a
foreign language onto Indigenous lands is similar to building fences,
roads, dams, plowing crops, and extracting minerals. The call from
Indigenous peoples has been what we do to our lands, we do to
ourselves, an agentic relationship. There are few fluent speakers of
Indigenous languages just as there are few places untouched by
145 Viola Faye Cordova, Time, Culture, and Self, in How IT IS: THE NATIVE AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHY OF V.F. CORDOVA 171, 173 (Kathleen Dean Moore et al. eds., 2007).
146 See generally G. Evelyn Hutchinson, Concluding Remarks, 22 COLD SPRING HARBOR
SYMPOSIA ON QUANTITATIVE BIOLOGY 415 (1957).
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colonialism. We are all living in a recent story of how our lands are
being destroyed much like our stories of the past. Indigenous peoples
have experienced similar change before.
Indigenous storytelling of climate change are theoretical anchors.
As an explanation of phenomena these stories are held as "theories" that
indigenous communities adapt, are regenerative, and take on the
responsibilities before us and how we live in our homelands.147 This
contrasts with colonialism, defined as a "policy or practice of acquiring
full or partial political control over another country, occupying it with
settlers and exploiting it economically."148 "It" being our homelands,
there is a lack of theoretical anchors similar to Indigenous peoples.
Theoretical anchors are grounded in the sacredness of place that,
"'[t]heory' isn't just an intellectual pursuit-it is woven within kinetics,
spiritual presence and emotion, it is contextual and relational. It is
intimate and personal, with individuals themselves holding the
responsibilities for finding and generating meaning within their own
lives."149 Settlers with a colonial mindset act in funny ways, such that as
a product of Western European paradigms there is a denial of climate
change because scientific theory is only for academics, whereas
Indigenous "theory" is for everyone.150 Being anchored to a .homeland
forbids denial of homeland destruction.
Indigenous Knowledge cannot be defined and shouldn't be. Scholars
James Youngblood Henderson and Marie Ann Battiste offer a
conceptualization as such:
Perhaps the closest one can get to describing unity in Indigenous
knowledge is that knowledge is the expression of the vibrant relationships
between people, their ecosystems, and other living beings and spirits that
share their lands.... All aspects of knowledge are interrelated and cannot
be separated from the traditional territories of the people concerned.... To
the Indigenous ways of knowing, the self exists within a world that is
subject to flux. The purpose of these ways of knowing is to reunify the
world or at least to reconcile the world to itself. Indigenous knowledge is
the way of living within contexts of flux, paradox, and tension, respecting
the pull of dualism and reconciling opposing forces. . . . Developing these
ways of knowing leads to freedom of consciousness and to solidarity with
the natural world.'151
Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) is understood from the
perspective of a Eurocentric lens, which extracts from Indigenous
Knowledge what it perceives as science knowing from Indigenous
147 See Leanne Betasamosake Simpson, Land as Pedagogy: Nishnaabeg Intelligence and
Rebellious Transformation, 3 DEcOLONIZATION: INDIGENEITY, EDUc. & Soc'Y, 2014, at 1, 7.
148 Colonialism, LEXIco, https://perma.cc/6PLU-8QQX (last visited Apr. 18, 2020).
149 Simpson, supra note 147, at 7.
150 Id. at 7-9.
151 See Deborah McGregor, Coming Full Circle: Indigenous Knowledge, Environment,
and Our Future, 28 AM. INDIAN Q. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 385, 390 (2003).
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peoples. However, an explanation of TEK is better described by
Indigenous scholar Martha Johnson who states the following:
[A] body of knowledge built up by a group of people through generations of
living in close contact with nature. It includes a system of classification, a
set of empirical observations about the local environment, and a system of
self-management hat governs resource use. The quantity and quality of
traditional environmental knowledge varies among community members,
depending upon gender, age, social status, intellectual capability, and
profession (hunter, spiritual leader, healer, etc.). With its roots firmly in
the past, traditional environmental knowledge is both cumulative and
dynamic, building upon the experience of earlier generations and adapting
to the new technological and socioeconomic changes of the present.1
52
TEK is a relationship with land and Creation, not just about a
relationship with land and Creation. Gregory Cajete, Tewa Indian from
the Santa Clara Pueblo and Professor of Native American Studies and
Language Literacy Sociocultural Studies at the University of New
Mexico, where he is a leading expert on the integration of Indigenous
knowledge in education and science states:
Native people traditionally lived a kind of communal environmental ethics
that stemmed from the broadest sense of kinship with all life. The
underlying aim of the science of ecology, therefore, the understanding of
the web of relationships with the "household" of Nature, is not modern
science's sole property. Understanding the relationship scientifically is not
enough-living and nurturing these relationships is the key. This is the
ecology of the Native community.
15 3
Regardless of the different tribal nations of the authors represented
here in the above quotes, there is a distinction, is/about, as
relationships with ecosystems are viewed differently, shaping a different
worldview from European thinking. Reconciling these differences in the
present for Indigenous peoples becomes difficult when past, present and
future generations live in an English-speaking worldview. Needing to
define what Indigenous Knowledge, Traditional Knowledge, or
Traditional Ecological Knowledge is, is necessarily dangerous.
Evidence of TEK can been seen in many Indigenous cultures by
their relationships with their homelands. For instance, a seasonal round
as depicted by Shoshone language instructor Drusilla Gould at Idaho
State University shows how the people move about the land through the
seasons by solstices, equinoxes, and moon phases.1
54 As those times
152 Id. at 393.
153 Id. at 394.
154 Drusilla Gould et al., The Mathematical Ecology of the Shoshoni and Implications
for Elementary Mathematics Education and the Young Learner, 40 J. AM. INDIAN EDUC. 1,
16 (2001).
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come, they sing songs and dance to welcome in the season.155 Each
season is marked by moon phases informing when to hunt, gather, and
fish for certain species of plants and animals. All of this is done
randomly to take what is needed and no more from one population, so as
not to wipe out a whole population. Moving about the land was
important because it established a respectful, giving and taking
relationship with life-sustaining living and non-living entities. Thus, it
also follows why we speak in verbs because it is the moving across the
land driving the basis of our cultures such as values, customs, protocols,
ethics, and traditions. Unlike Western culture where the noun is the
primary focus of a sentence, the noun is secondary to the action-based
culture. We move place to place. We give our songs, dances, and tobacco
in relationship with taking of life. We are primarily interested in verbs,
the doing. Tygi and hoawai are seminal to our way of living and always
will be.
Storytelling is a matrix of human experiences over time. The
pattern system or matrices of thought to which the language speaks of
and represents is a tool to make that representation more fluid. When
the language is absent, it has been shown the pattern system remains
and is reflected in recent research.156 The study showed a precociousness
to ecological orientation in Menominee children, although they don't
disclose a fluency of language. The study was designed using the
English language and Western tools of science. Yet, the results
demonstrated the culturally based epistemological orientations of the
Menominee people that was implicit in the nature and spirit of
language. Fluency of Indigenous languages is important to preserving
different ways of knowing and knowledge. It would behoove the
scientific enterprise to co-lead this effort with the peoples of whose lands
they are occupying. We call on scientists to be true to their fundamental
interest in seeking knowledge by embracing Indigenous languages and
thinkers. The scientific community should shape culturally based
epistemological orientations, thus bringing new knowledge from
Indigenous cultures.
We now review some of the recent research that reveals the distinct
relationship Indigenous peoples have with land and nature. For
example, in Cultural Mosaics and Mental Models of Nature,157 there are
significant differences of how cultural groups such as Indigenous and
non-Indigenous peoples see themselves on the land as a part of nature
and apart from nature, they foreground and background this
relationship with nature, respectively. This is important because as they
explain, the "cultural framework theories provide individuals with
skeletal principles for meaning making, including beliefs about what
sorts of things are relevant, worthy of attention and in need of
155 Id. at 11.
156 Megan Bang et al., Cultural Mosaics and Mental Models of Nature, 104 PROC. NAT'L




explanation."158  Specifically, in hunting experiences there are
differences that provide perspectives of human relationship with nature,
plants and animals, and the land. In the Euro-American sense hunters
follow a set of protocols such as, but not limited to, a uniform, an ethic,
and shared stories of hunting experiences.1
59 The Euro-American
experience is categorical, whereas in the foregrounding of, all of nature
is in us, all of us is in nature,160 our experiences are not necessarily
focused on person, place, or thing. Rather, there are more nuanced
interests in non-categorical processes. This sentiment is illustrated in
Cordova's quote of her father's teachings161-that a life force transfers
through eating and ingesting traditional foods thereby eating is a taking
of daily sacrament so that life goes on. From the English perspective our
teachings are complicated because they go against the ideas of
separation. In a highly interrelated connection of life forces we are
experiencing both science and spirituality at the same time. We do not
separate those two ideas in the transfer of life to life through eating. For
us it is complicated to practice a science way of thinking in one box,
eating in another, and praying in another.
IV. TO INTERPRET AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES AS THE TRIBES WOULD
HAVE UNDERSTOOD THEM
Indigenous peoples of Turtle Island tell stories about the roles of
plants and animals for their survivance16 2 and adaptively in the twenty-
first century in a formation of red pedagogy
1 63 upon highly modified
landscapes to riverscapes from continued settlement.1
64 These stories
are "contracts" between Indigenous peoples and life forms, and the
environment (water, land, and sky) they rely upon:
165 Within the
158 Id. at 13,868.
159 See Sammy L. Matsaw, Teachings from the Land of my Ancestors: Knowing Places as
a Gatherer, Hunter, Fisher and Ecologist, in PLACE-BASED LEARNING FOR THE PLATE:
HUNTING, FORAGING, AND FISHING FOR FOOD (Joel B. Pontius et al. eds., 2020).
160 See LAME DEER & ERDOES, supra note 144.
161 Cordova, supra note 145, at 173.
162 See generally Gerald Vizenor, The Ruins of Representation, 17 AM. INDIAN Q. 7
(1993).
163 See SANDY GRANDE, RED PEDAGOGY: NATIVE AMERICAN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
THOUGHT 15 (Rowman & Littlefield eds., 2015). "Rather than narratives solely recounting
destruction and demise, Native stores about Native history tend to focus on what White
Earth Ojibwe scholar Gerald Vizenor has called survivance-a narrative incorporating
themes of survival and resistance that insist on the inclusion of the Native presence." His-
tory of Survivance: Upper Midwest 19th-Century Native American Narratives, DIGITAL
PUB. LIBR. AM., https://perma.cc/V9A3-32CP (last visited Apr. 23, 2020).
164 Paul Goble has written numerous children's books recounting traditional indigenous
stories. See PAUL GOBLE, THE LEGEND OF THE WHITE BUFFALO WOMAN (2002); PAUL
GOBLE, THE GREAT RACE OF THE BIRDS AND ANIMALS (1991); PAUL GOBLE, ALL OUR
RELATIVES: TRADITIONAL NATIVE AMERICAN THOUGHTS ABOUT NATURE (2005).
165 Freshwaters Illustrated & Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Comm'n, The Lost Fish:
The Struggle to Save Pacific Lamprey, COLUMBIA RIVER INTER-TRIBAL FISH COMM'N
(2013), https://perma.cc/K7R2-4CHC.
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agreements human beings are to take care of them as they sacrificed
themselves to take care of Indigenous peoples. Because of the
"contractual" relationship, Indigenous peoples remember to remember at
intervals within the seasons to pay homage to life forms and the
environment.166 The seasonal ceremony can begin in spring paying
homage to "Traditional Foods," also known as "First Foods" in the
Pacific Northwest, through varying customs and traditions, usually
dependent on the bounded space of each tribe.167 The ceremonies
continue throughout the year through a seasonal round: central to moon
and sun phases (i.e., months, equinox, and solstice), while
acknowledging the plants and animals, and the environmental phase of
the harvest time through song and dance. However, driven mainly by a
highly modified landscape, climate change, and a mass extinction event
primarily because of colonization and its derivatives (i.e.,
industrialization, capitalism, etc.), these forces have continued to
endanger and threaten Indigenous culture, identity, language, and
sovereignty.168 The time is now to re-evaluate treaties as the tribes
would have understood them, on their terms, without Euro-what-have-
you intervention.
The hunting and fishing rights in the Treaty of Fort Bridger with
the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation have been
interpreted in two strikingly different cases discussed above. In the
1896 Supreme Court case of Race Horse, the Court gave no meaning to
the understanding of the Tribes, interpreting their rights as "temporary
and precarious"169 and thus easily abrogated by the admission of a state
to the union.170 In the Idaho Supreme Court case, Tinno,171 the court
admitted expert testimony on linguistics and concluded that because the
Tribes did not separate hunting and fishing in language using the
Shoshone verb tygi and the Bannock verb hoawai in reference to
obtaining wild food, the words "to hunt" in the treaty include a fishing
right.172 Tinno illustrates the understanding of language that must be
entered in cases interpreting treaty language.
Tygi/hoawai as a set of learning processes that can be thought of as,
but not limited to, part of a living and nurturing of relationships with
land and Creation through a seasonal round. Experimental processes as
a continual study design honoring time (i.e., moon phases, equinox, and
solstice) and space (i.e., usual and accustomed use areas bounded by the
four directions) by a set of protocols, customs, and traditions. Shared
through communications of art expressed in song, dance, paintings,
166 ROBIN KIMMERER, BRAIDING SWEETGRASS: INDIGENOUS WISDOM, SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE AND THE TEACHINGS OF PLANTS (2013).
167 Cordova, supra note 145.
168 DANIEL R. WILDCAT, RED ALERT! SAVING THE PLANET WITH INDIGENOUS
KNOWLEDGE, 39 (2009).
169 Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 510 (1896).
170 Id. at 509-10.
171 Tinno, 497 P.2d 1386 (Idaho 1972).
172 Id. at 1389-90.
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pictographs, and language. Daily celebrations with a beingness of
eating, adorning, and honoring the gathering of wild foods to care for
ourselves, our families, communities and ecosystems we moved in and
out of, on water and land, regenerating and adapting Shoshone-Bannock
knowledge since time immemorial. Accordingly, when we give weight to
the verb-thought world the definition of "to hunt" in the English
language, a noun-thought world, it is quite limiting to the ideas-
feelings-spiritual sense of the Shoshone-Bannock treaty signatories and
how they would have understood tygi/hoawai. Tygi and hoawai have
much more meaning than the English translation "to hunt." The
Shoshone-Bannock ancestors would have understood to hunt as to
gather wild foods, including fishing. The idea to gather wild foods does
not stop there.
"[C]ulture should not be understood as individual traits, but rather
as the constellation of ways in which people think, act, and make sense
of the world."173 Only by acknowledging the deep cultural and ethnic
roots of language through the evidence admitted in court cases,
interpreting treaties with American Indian tribes, may the courts of the
colonizer begin to reconcile the conflicting world views and begin to
address the sacred responsibility to the Indigenous peoples of Turtle
Island (America).
173 Bang et al., supra note 156, at 13,872.
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